Utah officials pressed the Trump administration to approve a limited expansion of Medicaid just days after voters in the state last November supported a ballot measure calling for a broader expansion under Obamacare, according to correspondence obtained by POLITICO.
Emails and text messages obtained through a Utah public records request indicate that state and federal officials, in the immediate aftermath of the successful ballot measure, were privately discussing a slimmed-down Medicaid plan. They talked about covering fewer people than the Obamacare expansion, while implementing unprecedented curbs on the safety-net health care program.
Instead of adopting full Medicaid expansion insuring about 150,000 low-income adults, Utah Republicans earlier this month passed legislation covering about 90,000 people while asking the Trump administration to approve billions of dollars in enhanced funding under Obamacare. Utah is also asking the administration’s permission for significant new restraints on the program — including enrollment caps in case of cost overruns and per-person limits on spending — that the federal government has never before approved.
Obamacare required states to expand Medicaid to adults earning up to 138 percent of the federal poverty line — about $17,200 for an individual — to receive more generous funding from the federal government. The Obama and Trump administrations have not allowed states to do more limited Medicaid expansions while still receiving full Obamacare funding, but Republican lawmakers in Utah have insisted for weeks that Trump officials provided assurances they would back the plan.
State officials first formally asked the Trump administration to approve a so-called partial expansion last summer — months before 53 percent of Utah voters approved the Medicaid expansion ballot initiative — but the state never received an answer. Utah Medicaid Director Nathan Checketts told POLITICO that officials at the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services suggested they would revisit the state's request after last November's election.
The documents obtained by POLITICO show that the state, shortly after the election, ramped up pressure on the Trump administration to decide whether to allow partial expansions. These discussions occurred weeks before Utah Republicans introduced their legislation shrinking the voter-approved expansion, angering supporters of the ballot initiative.
Checketts and top Trump health officials, including then-Medicaid head Mary Mayhew and CMS senior counselor Calder Lynch, were in frequent contact during the following weeks.
“We know the state's request would be something new for CMS and represents a significant policy decision. Therefore, we understand why CMS has taken time to review and consider the state's request,” Checketts wrote to senior agency officials on Nov. 20, shortly after they had discussed the proposal during a conference in Washington, D.C.
“Even if CMS is not able to approve this request, our policy makers will benefit from knowing which options are (or are not) likely to be approved,” Checketts continued.
Ten days later on Nov. 30, Checketts wrote to Mayhew and Lynch that the governor’s office was "reemphasizing our state's interest in getting a response” on its partial expansion request. About two weeks later, in mid-December, CMS Administrator Seema Verma spoke with Utah Gov. Gary Herbert about the plan, according to the emails.
The emails from federal Medicaid officials never said whether they would approve the Utah plan.
“We haven’t had any promises," Checketts said Thursday. “We’re optimistic about the chances."
On Dec. 26, Checketts wrote to Lynch that he would be meeting with “key legislators” the following day to discuss expansion options. A text message between the two on Dec. 27 also mentions “new flexibilities being offered" to design the state's Medicaid program.
“When they sort of open the door and say we’re going to be more flexible, as a state we’re trying to figure out, well, what exactly does that mean?” Checketts said.
States have long pushed the federal government for greater leeway to tailor their Medicaid programs, which they jointly run with the federal government. The Trump administration, however, is encouraging new flexibility that would let red states reshape the entitlement in ways that Democrats say undermine the coverage program and may be illegal.
The administration has approved Medicaid work requirements in several states, though they’re being challenged in court. The administration is also readying a plan that would allow states to seek Medicaid block grants to rein in spending, a long-standing conservative goal.
A spokesperson for CMS declined to comment on Utah's pending request but said its conversations with the state weren't unusual.
"Medicaid is based on a collaborative federal/state partnership, given that, it should come as no surprise that CMS speaks with states all the time, including Utah, about a variety of issues regarding their programs," the agency spokesperson said.
Obamacare supporters said that Utah officials are ignoring voters by pursuing a partial Medicaid expansion. Further, they say state officials are making a risky bet that the Trump administration will approve such a plan for the first time — and could be inviting litigation if it does.
Nate Crippes, an attorney at the Disability Law Center, said the state's proposal to cap funding is especially troubling.
"I would be very, very surprised if that wasn't challenged," he said.
The Trump administration will review the Utah plan in the coming months. Key state lawmakers said Trump health officials have signaled their support.
“They are telling us ... this is going to happen,” said state Rep. Jim Dunnigan, who sponsored the scaled-back Medicaid plan in the Utah House, earlier this month.
While the Utah plan undergoes federal review, the state will expand coverage on April 1 to people below the poverty line, initially without the enhanced Obamacare funding. That move will cost the state tens of millions of dollars more than the full Obamacare expansion would have. Poor adults earning above the poverty line, who would otherwise be enrolled in Medicaid expansion, will remain eligible to receive generous Obamacare subsidies to purchase private coverage.
If the Trump administration refuses the state's plan, the Utah law includes a trigger that would automatically adopt the full Obamacare expansion. At the same time, the state would ask the Trump administration for permission to add requirements for some people to work to maintain coverage.
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
Sen. Jim Risch was on the verge of facing down an insurgency from his GOP colleagues.
Top Senate Republicans were fuming at the Trump administration last week for ignoring congressional demands to further investigate the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.
But Risch, the newly minted chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wasn’t eager to preside over an intraparty fight. And so he quickly began working to calm GOP senators — even giving potentially misleading information.
The Idaho Republican told several of his GOP colleagues that President Donald Trump had complied with the Magnitsky Act by sending Congress a report determining who was responsible for the Saudi journalist’s murder — even though the administration had already publicly declared that it was going to ignore lawmakers’ demand.
Asked about the administration’s refusal, Sen. Cory Gardner (R-Colo.) — one of the many Republicans who was livid with the White House — said Risch told him the opposite had happened.
“It sounds like there is confusion about what exactly did or didn’t come” from the administration, said Gardner, who serves on the Foreign Relations Committee. “Sen. Risch just informed me that the administration has complied with the law. So you might want to clarify with Sen. Risch.”
In the days that followed, Risch also composed a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, asking for a classified briefing on the administration's efforts to hold the Saudi government accountable. Republican aides said it represented an effort by Risch to dampen GOP anger and unite the party.
The episode underscores Risch’s desire to quell any revolt within the GOP rank and file and avoid picking public fights with the president. And it suggests the committee is likely to be a major site of internal GOP conflict over Trump in the new Congress.
Suzanne Wrasse, a spokeswoman for Risch, acknowledged the senator’s efforts to unite the GOP side of the committee, which included the previously unreported one-on-one meetings with Gardner and other Republican senators.
“As someone with decades of public service and leadership experience, Chairman Risch knows that a good leader is a good listener who looks for areas where there is consensus,” Wrasse said. “After hearing from some members with additional questions for the administration about Khashoggi’s murder, he communicated directly with each Republican member of the committee and ultimately led a letter inviting the administration to brief him and his colleagues.”
Gardner wasn’t the only Republican member Risch apparently tried to placate. Florida Sen. Marco Rubio — who similarly rebuked Trump — also talked with the chairman. He said Risch told him the Trump administration followed the law.
When asked about his interactions with Gardner and Rubio, Risch confirmed that he told the senators that the Trump administration complied with the Magnitsky Act.
“Yeah, sure, they did,” Risch said, despite the administration’s stonewalling. “They’ve been very forthcoming. They’ve given us, I think, everything that they’ve had. So they’re doing well.”
Risch’s letter to Pompeo also largely masked the divisions within his party. He secured signatures from every GOP member of the committee except Sens. Mitt Romney of Utah and Rand Paul of Kentucky.
Romney's office declined to comment and Paul's spokesperson said he was never asked to sign the letter.
That effort, however, was initially intended to be bipartisan, aides and senators said. Risch’s letter praised Pompeo for the administration’s “ongoing efforts” to work with Congress on the issue, but it did not reference the administration’s stated refusal to comply with the Magnitsky Act.
According to a draft of the letter obtained by POLITICO and rejected by Risch, Democrats attempted to insert language stating that the administration “is not in compliance” with the law, “which is of grave concern to members of this committee.” That draft was never sent.
Toward the end of his tenure as chairman, Risch’s predecessor, former Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.), often used the committee to directly and publicly question and push back against Trump’s foreign policy. That included regularly speaking out against Trump and holding hearings where senators could grill senior administration officials. Risch, on the other hand, has said he would air his disagreements with the president in private.
Democrats say they’re concerned that Risch is turning the Foreign Relations Committee — which has a history of pushing back on presidents of both parties, regardless of the chairman’s party — into a rubber-stamp for Trump.
“If we let him get away with this — I mean, we might as well repeal the Magnitsky Act if we’re willing to endorse a president refusing a certification like this,” said Connecticut Sen. Chris Murphy, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. “I think it’s really unfortunate if the Foreign Relations Committee takes the position that the president is complying with the law when he clearly is not.”
Many Republicans agree. In a brief interview, Rubio said it is clear that the Trump administration’s “policy is that they refuse to follow the law with regard to Magnitsky.” But he said Congress — and the Foreign Relations Committee in particular — has no tools at its disposal to force the Trump administration to send lawmakers a full report on Khashoggi’s murder.
“The congressional branch has the ability to stop things from happening, but it doesn’t have a lot of power to make the president do anything,” Rubio said. “So obviously, you could take action on unrelated matters to force an administration to do something, but ultimately there’s no law we can pass that makes them answer a question if they refuse to comply.”
A senior administration official said that Trump “maintains his discretion to decline to act on congressional committee requests when appropriate” — indicating that the president has no intention of complying with the law, despite Risch’s public statements to the contrary.
“I don’t know what he’s talking about,” Sen. Bob Menendez, the top Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, said in response to Risch’s comments. “There’s no confusion that, from my perspective, the president did not comply with the law. And so saying what they’ve said — which is a reiteration of the past — is not a response to the specific request under Magnitsky.”
Rubio, Gardner and others count themselves among a majority of senators who, after receiving a classified briefing on Khashoggi’s October murder inside the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, concluded that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was complicit in the killing.
Trump himself has been reluctant to ascribe any blame for Khashoggi’s murder to the crown prince, citing the need to maintain a close relationship with Riyadh in the name of counterterrorism and security cooperation.
“You don’t send 17 people that close to the government overseas to kill someone in a consulate and the crown prince does not know about it, at a minimum, or direct it,” Rubio said.
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
The Bernie Sanders vs. Elizabeth Warren primary is on.
The run-up to their presidential announcements sparked concern on the left that having both of them in the race would split the activist base and clear the way for a more moderate nominee. Now that they’re both in, the competition between the two promises to be one of the more intriguing subplots of the primary.
Sanders starts out indisputably ahead. Bolstered by the grassroots army he amassed in 2016, the Vermont senator easily outraised Warren in the first 24 hours of their campaigns. He’s far ahead of her in the polls, too, trailing only former Vice President Joe Biden, who hasn’t announced whether he’ll run.
Sanders’ camp is treating Warren accordingly. He and his aides are avoiding any whiff of public criticism of Warren. They declined even to respond when her allies argued last week that Sanders entering the race would benefit her.
Warren’s team downplays the metrics surrounding their campaign launches, instead taking the long view. If Sanders falters after weeks or months as a front-runner — he is guaranteed to draw more scrutiny now than he did in 2016, given his strength from the outset — the Massachusetts senator wants to be seen as a more viable alternative to beat Donald Trump in a general election.
But the fact remains that the two occupy similar ideological space and will inevitably be competing for many of the same voters. For the time being, they seem intent on avoiding one another.
Warren has sought to head off comparisons with Sanders by creating her own space where she hopes she’ll catch fire. She’s gone out of her way to avoid the “socialism” tag — declaring she is “a capitalist to her bones” — putting her in a position to step in if Sanders, a self-described democratic socialist, is rejected for being too far left. (On Thursday, he came under fire from Florida Democrats after declining to answer whether Venezuela's socialist dictator, Nicolas Maduro, should step down.)
In stump speeches, Warren is not just embracing “Medicare for All” — one of Sanders’ 2016 rallying cries — but attempting to offer her own distinct platform with a menu of proposals such as providing free child care for millions of low-income children.
“One of the mistakes that a lot of presidential candidates make is they try to take the lessons from the last race and apply them to the current campaign,” said Doug Rubin, a Boston-based strategist and past Warren adviser. “I think what Elizabeth is doing, she’s already moving the debate aggressively forward with her tax on the wealthy and child care proposal. She’s not just trying to rerun the last race in a better way, she’s trying to run on new issues that really matter to people.”
Her allies are arguing that she actually benefits from Sanders being in the race, because the “center of gravity” will now move toward their similar economic populist and anti-Wall Street message. Eventually, they believe, voters will decide that she’s the candidate best able to defeat Trump, and offering the best fit for an era in which more record-breaking numbers of women are running for and winning elected office.
“Both are very good on the issues that are popular to voters, and both would conceivably beat Trump,” said Adam Green, co-founder of the pro-Warren Progressive Change Campaign Committee. “We feel Elizabeth Warren is the most electable of the Democratic primary field because she’s a progressive woman who voters see as instinctively fighting for working people and willing to challenge powerful interests.”
Asked about Green’s theory, Sanders’ team didn’t bite.
“Sen. Warren has been a fighter for working people,” said spokeswoman Arianna Jones, “and Bernie considers her a close friend. We look forward to a positive campaign of ideas.”
The Sanders campaign is making a concerted effort to hire women and minorities, unveiling a diverse group of top hires and campaign co-chairs this week. His 2016 campaign was criticized for being too white and male, and for allowing alleged sexual harassment to fester.
In an interview with The Young Turks on Tuesday, Sanders suggested that he would seek a woman younger than him as a running mate.
"I think we would look for somebody who is maybe not of the same gender that I am, and maybe somebody might be a couple of years younger than me,” he said, "and somebody who can take the progressive banner as vice president and carry it all over this country.”
But Sanders’ entry is already creating a strategic challenge for Warren’s campaign on several fronts. Chief among them is small-dollar fundraising. Beyond the sheer competition for small dollars, each time Sanders reports a blockbuster haul it will be compared with Warren’s numbers.
Activists and friendly media outlets already are contrasting the two candidates’ handling of race and gender issues, their policies and their theory of change in government. After his launch, Indivisible's national political director praised Sanders on Twitter as having an "exciting vision" on Medicare for All and free college tuition, but added that she "laments his racially agnostic language" while discussing economic inequality.
An article in Jacobin, a socialist magazine, described them both as anti-establishment and anti-Wall Street, but said Sanders "prefers to use the government's power to tax and spend directly to meet America's needs — or replace the market altogether," while Warren "wants to empower regulators and rejigger markets to shape 'pre-distribution' income, before taxes."
Had Sanders opted not to run, Warren would have been well-positioned to win over many of his supporters. According to the most recent Morning Consult online survey, 26 percent of Sanders’ supporters said Biden was their second choice and 16 percent said Warren was their second choice.
Sanders’ entry obviously dampens those prospects for Warren.
“Had Bernie decided not to run, I think 90 percent of his people would have flooded to Elizabeth Warren. There’s almost no question in my mind,” said Jonathan Tasini, who served as a national surrogate for Sanders in 2016 and who authored "The Essential Bernie Sanders and His Vision for America." “If either Bernie or Elizabeth Warren end up being the nominee, the other part of that family will be satisfied. I can’t think of people who are Elizabeth Warren supporters who would be upset or vice versa.”
In 2016, Sanders absorbed a fairly robust movement of progressives who tried to draft Warren to run against Hillary Clinton. The “Ready for Warren” campaign grew to 60,000 people nationwide before turning into a larger “Run Warren Run” initiative.
When Warren declined, many of those people fled to Sanders.
Charles Lenchner, founder of Ready for Warren and then one of the founders of an early drafting effort for Sanders, said dynamics have changed since he attempted to enlist Warren in 2016.
“I think her influence in the primary is a good one,” Lenchner said. However: “Warren surrounds herself with consultants who are lifers in Washington. … She does not surround herself with people who are activists of movements who get arrested and all of that stuff.”
“I think she is not, at this time, doing the kinds of things that will create a relationship between a grass-roots movement and her primary campaign,” he added.
The New Hampshire primary could prove decisive for each of them, given that they hail from neighboring states.
Sanders walloped Hillary Clinton there in 2016. But Warren has worked to steadily make inroads: pumping money to help New Hampshire Democrats win 2018 races, hiring key operatives early and already hosting four campaign events there since January. On Friday, she’ll keynote a major fundraiser for the state’s Democratic Party.
Sanders, though, has the polling edge right now. A University of Massachusetts Amherst survey released this week found that 20 percent of likely Democratic voters said they would back him if the primary contest were held today, while 9 percent said they would support Warren. Biden was in the lead with 28 percent.
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
President Donald Trump is eagerly anticipating his second summit with Kim Jong Un, touting his “really meaningful” relationship with the North Korean strongman and insisting he’s ready to give up his nuclear arsenal.
In Washington, he’s pretty much the only one who feels that way.
Many, including several of the president’s top advisers, are less excited. Some have expressed trepidation not only that the summit, scheduled to take place next week in Hanoi, may not yield big results. They worry, too, that Trump, eager to declare victory on the world stage, could make big concessions in exchange for empty promises of denuclearization.
The push for a second summit came almost entirely from the president himself, according to current and former White House officials — but Trump remains undeterred. He has gushed about the “wonderful letters” he has received from Kim, as well as the “good rapport” he has developed with the North Korean leader and the enormous media coverage the event in Vietnam's capital is likely to attract. Trump even bragged, in a phone call Tuesday with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, that he is the only person who can make progress on denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, according to a person briefed on the conversation, and complained about negative news coverage he has received.
Inside the administration, concern about the upcoming summit has come from predictable skeptics, including national security adviser John Bolton, a longtime opponent of diplomacy with North Korea, but also from unexpected corners. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the man charged with leading the negotiations, has expressed frustration to allies about the lack of diplomatic progress and voiced concern that his boss will get outmaneuvered, according to a source with direct knowledge of the conversations. Other top officials, such as former Defense Secretary James Mattis, simply worked to keep as much distance from the negotiations as possible.
“There is not optimism in the administration,” said Ian Bremmer, founder and president of the Eurasia Group. “Pompeo is deeply skeptical that we are going to get anything of substance on denuclearization from Kim Jong Un, and Pompeo believes the North Koreans are just playing for time.”
The State Department declined to comment. A spokesman for Bolton did not reply to a request for comment.
Bolton said bluntly in December that the North Koreans had not honored even the vague pledge, made in a joint declaration that came out of last year’s Singapore summit, to “work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Since then, satellite images revealed that North Korea has continued to build out a number of hidden missile bases whose existence it has never acknowledged.
“They have not lived up to the commitments so far,” Bolton said at The Wall Street Journal’s annual CEO conference, seeming to distance himself from Trump’s view of the negotiations. “That’s why I think the president thinks another summit is likely to be productive.”
The North Koreans’ continuing work on the secret nuclear sites was revealed in a detailed report published by the Beyond Parallel program, run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The program’s director, Victor Cha, a former National Security Council official, said he and his colleagues packed the report with detailed images in the hopes of catching the attention of a president who doesn’t read, but responds to imagery, Cha said in an interview on Thursday.
The report did get Trump’s attention. The president blasted out a tweet about a New York Times story summarizing the report: “The story in the New York Times concerning North Korea developing missile bases is inaccurate,” Trump said. "We fully know about the sites being discussed, nothing new - and nothing happening out of the normal. Just more Fake News. I will be the first to let you know if things go bad!”
The administration is downplaying expectations for next week’s summit. Senior U.S. officials told reporters on Thursday that despite North Korea’s pledge to denuclearize last June, the two sides have yet to reach an agreement on what, exactly, denuclearization means — and whether Kim is committed to it. The summit, according to a senior U.S. official, will focus in part on “developing a shared understanding of what denuclearization is.”
“I don’t know if North Korea has made the decision yet to denuclearize,” the official said. Trump said earlier this week that, though he is in no rush to make a deal, he believes North Korea will “ultimately” denuclearize.
Pompeo, in an interview with NBC’s "Today" show on Thursday, set a low bar for the upcoming meeting. “The good news is they haven’t conducted missile tests or nuclear tests in now well over a year so that’s better than the place that we found it when the Trump administration came into office, but as the president said yesterday and as the administration has said repeatedly, this is a long and difficult task,” he said.
Other officials have publicly contradicted the president’s optimistic line on Kim’s intentions.
Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats and CIA Director Gina Haspel told a Senate panel last month that North Korea is unlikely to give up its nuclear arsenal. “The regime is committed to developing a long-range nuclear armed missile that would pose a direct threat to the United States,” Haspel said.
The comments bothered Trump, according to NewsMax CEO Chris Ruddy. “I’m hearing from sources around the White House that there’s just general disappointment of the president with Director Coats,” Ruddy, a close ally of the president, told CNN host Christiane Amanpour this week. The White House declined to comment on Coats’ standing within the administration, but Trump told reporters Tuesday that he “hasn't even thought about” firing him.
Since the president’s historic meeting with Kim in Singapore last June, when the two first met face-to-face, the North Koreans have shown reluctance to deal with any American official aside from the president himself. The State Department’s special representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, struggled to persuade his North Korean counterparts to work directly with him until late December, according to half a dozen sources in and outside of government familiar with the negotiations. Though they have engaged over the past six weeks, their discussions have yielded little substantive progress, and Trump and Kim are slated for another one-on-one conversation in Hanoi, administration officials said Thursday.
“If the working-level people were achieving what they wanted to achieve, then I’d feel really good about this, but the North Koreans know that they can get a better deal from the president, so they’d rather talk to just him,” Cha said.
“The North Koreans basically won’t deal with anybody other than Trump. They won’t deal with Biegun, they won’t deal with Pompeo, so if there’s going to be any movement, it’s going come at that level,” said a former administration official. “The summit does have some potential to do good because it can break the logjam. But coming out of the summit, Trump is going to want to declare it a success and a victory and everybody else will be frustrated because nothing really has changed.”
Lawmakers are no more optimistic than many in the administration, and some have begun to turn the legislative gears, proposing a bill in advance of the summit that would prevent the president from striking any deal that involves a massive troop withdrawal from South Korea.
Introduced in late January by Reps. Mike Gallagher (R.-Wisc.) and Tom Malinowski (D-N.J.) the “United States and Republic of Korea Alliance Support Act” would prohibit the Pentagon from using funds to reduce troops levels in South Korea below 22,000 unless the defense secretary certifies to Congress that it can be done without harming U.S. national security.
The presence of nearly 30,000 American soldiers in South Korea has been an ongoing preoccupation for Trump, who ordered the Pentagon to produce plans for reducing troop numbers on the peninsula several weeks before his first summit with North Korea last June. His argument — that the U.S. bears too much of the economic burden for protecting South Korea — has alarmed experts and lawmakers alike, who have expressed concern about what the president might agree to without consulting his advisers, or in the face of their opposition.
It also has threatened to drive a wedge between the United States and South Korea, which for decades has relied on the U.S. as the ultimate guarantor of its security.
Last year in Singapore, the president impulsively agreed to halt joint military exercises with the South Koreans, a fact that White House chief of staff John Kelly was forced to convey to former Defense Secretary Mattis after the fact, according to a source familiar with the conversation. Though administration officials have said a troop withdrawal is not under consideration, experts and lawmakers remain concerned that a similar scenario could unfold.
“Two days is a very long time to be sitting there, so I’m concerned that Trump, freewheeling, will tell Kim that troops can be on the table,” said Sue Mi Terry, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
AUSTIN, Texas—With rain hammering outside, Zack Malitz stood in a warehouse space lit by strands of bistro lights and began to reveal the campaign strategy of Beto O’Rourke in exacting detail. Malitz, who was the field director of O’Rourke’s Senate campaign, is a tall 30-year-old with thick glasses and a haircut that over the course of an election season can drift inexorably toward mopheadedness. He laid out the exact numbers of potential voters the campaign believed it should try to reach, how many of those voters had a cellphone contact available, and—with a bit of arithmetic—a critical sum that would drive the campaign's final push: the exact figure of volunteer phone-bank shifts he believed would be necessary to win the state.
This kind of granular campaign information is normally considered top secret, the kind of thing strategists guard behind passwords and fire underlings upon suspicion of leaking. If Malitz’s talk had resided in an encrypted PowerPoint presentation on a private server, it would have amounted to a creditable haul for a shift at the WikiLeaks home office. And if O’Rourke mounts a challenge to Donald Trump in 2020, that presentation may offer the purest encapsulation of how he might do it.
Yet Malitz was sharing it publicly, to hundreds of people who had seen an online call for supporters and decided to show up that day. It was September 15, less than two months before the Senate election, and nearly 2,000 people had registered for the stop on the campaign’s Plan to Win tour. More than 800 had ultimately traveled, through a rainstorm to a part of East Austin not known for available public parking, to attend.
“The plan to win is actually pretty simple,” Malitz said at the outset, his voice echoing from a handheld microphone. “Build a voter contact machine that enables thousands of volunteers in every single one of Texas’ 254 counties to have conversations with more voters across the state than any campaign in Texas history.”
For Democrats, that history was dismal. Malitz reminded his audience that the most recent presidential candidate to carry the state was Jimmy Carter, in 1976, and that no Democrat has won statewide office since 1994—the party’s longest losing streak in any state in the country. No Democrat running for Senate has come within even 10 percentage points of defeating an incumbent Republican in four decades. To construct a different fate in a midterm election, O’Rourke’s campaign would need to conjure 1 million votes from outside the current pool of active voters—in essence, create an entirely new electorate within the state’s borders.
This goal was so audacious that Malitz first had to convince his audience it was even demographically possible. He explained that the campaign’s data analysts had identified 5.5 million Texas voters who would be likely to support O’Rourke, but were not yet likely to vote in the 2018 election. The plan, he told his audience, was to go after every last one of them: at doorsteps, by text message and over phone calls launched by something Malitz called the Beto Dialer. All told, this would mean tens of millions of attempts to reach some of Texas’ most politically elusive citizens.
What was most radical was not the grandiosity of the rhetoric—lines about engaging everyone, especially nonvoters, are boilerplate in many Democratic speeches—but that a Texas Democrat could even have such a goal within his grasp. To meet it, O’Rourke’s campaign would need to pour fuel onto its already explosive growth, quickly adding thousands more unpaid callers, texters and block walkers to its ranks. The crowded rows before Malitz attested to the fact that O’Rourke could summon this level of volunteer manpower, but managing it all was a separate challenge. Building an organization of this scale might typically require months, even a year, of hiring and training field workers, then gradually seasoning them for new responsibilities. O’Rourke’s campaign had weeks.
“OK, so here we go!” Malitz exclaimed.
The mood swerved from TED talk to revival meeting. “If you’ve got space—a garage, your home, your business—that you’d like to donate for a pop-up, please stand up right now,” Malitz said. As people rose from their seats, Malitz summoned a round of applause—and then a dozen campaign staffers guided them to paperwork that would lock down their commitment. Then the same exercise for those volunteers who would manage a pop-up office or lead training for phone banks and block walks. Just minutes after having introduced his crowd to this mammoth project for the first time, Malitz had inducted hundreds of them into leadership roles.
At the same time Malitz was making his Plan to Win presentation in Austin, his deputy, Katelyn Coghlan, was reading from the same script in Houston to 354 attendees. Malitz had already given the pitch in Dallas and Denton, and was about to drive his Ford F-150, its backseat littered with Rockstar energy drinks and the Almanac of American Politics, to San Antonio to do it once more. Over events that weekend and the preceding one in Texas’ six largest cities, attendees committed to fill nearly 15,000 volunteer shifts.
Everything may be bigger in Texas, but when a two-term El Paso congressman set out to run for Senate the year before, there had been no reason to expect his campaign would reach such mammoth proportions. (It ended up with a staff similar in size to Donald Trump’s entire national organization in 2016.) For nearly a year, Malitz had been instilling in his team a relentless focus on growth at any cost, happy to trade away precision and accountability for scale. Along the way, they were happy to violate a number of shibboleths about how modern Democratic campaigns are supposed to operate.
O’Rourke is now on the precipice of running for president with “losing Senate candidate” as the most impressive line on his résumé. It was how he chose to run that campaign last year that sets him apart from his potential Democratic rivals. O’Rourke cast aside the hard-won heirlooms of Barack Obama’s campaigns: a vogue for data science, the grooming of a professional organizing class and a dedication to the humanism of one-on-one tutelage. Instead, his campaign followed principles that more closely resemble what Silicon Valley types call “hyperscale”—a system flexible enough to expand at exponential speed, paired with an understanding that getting big quickly can excuse and justify all kinds of other shortcomings.
In political terms, it amounted to a massive bet on a strategy of mobilizing infrequent voters instead of trying to win over dependable ones. National campaign strategists are paying close attention to how O’Rourke did it: Few candidates have committed as fully, if a bit recklessly, to the belief that a monomaniacal focus on large-scale turnout is the most powerful tool Democrats have to capitalize on their latent numerical majority in the United States.
Less than two months after Malitz’s presentation in Austin, when the numbers came in, it was clear that Beto O’Rourke had managed a showing stronger than any Texas Democrat in a generation. It was also clear that that wasn’t enough: On January 3, it was the Republican incumbent, Ted Cruz, who was sworn in to the Senate. Is the Beto for Senate campaign a blueprint for how a Democrat—including perhaps O’Rourke himself—ought to run nationally in 2020? Or is it a cautionary tale in the limits of mobilization?
There are two ways to win votes in an election. The first is persuasion—finding those already likely to vote and convincing them to pick you, either by selling your story or attacking your opponent. The other is mobilization, which means locating people already on your side, and nudging them to cast a ballot. Most candidates do some of each, spending money on mailers and ads as part of the persuasion campaign, while mobilizing flaky partisans with individualized reminders to vote.
Beto O’Rourke’s arrival in Washington in 2012 is easiest told as a persuasion story—a long-shot challenger for a seat in Congress who beat a familiar incumbent by convincing voters he was preferable to the other guy. O’Rourke at the time was a charismatic but generally undistinguished 39-year-old who had launched a Web design firm and served on the El Paso City Council; he was encouraged to run by a coterie of local power brokers seeking to dislodge Representative Silvestre Reyes, a formidable fixture in the reliably Democratic district in West Texas. O’Rourke’s primary challenge was boosted by a super PAC, funded in part by his father-in-law, that spent nearly a quarter-million dollars attacking Reyes for enriching his family over the course of a long congressional career. The ads helped to make the incumbent’s record the overwhelming issue for voters choosing between the two, so much so that Reyes’ late efforts to portray his opponent as a jejune backer of drug legalization appeared to come up flat.
O’Rourke himself, however, prefers to tell a very different story about his path to Washington. He likes to mention that he had personally knocked on 16,000 doors in a race decided by about 3,000 votes, never failing to mention that he wore out two pairs of shoes in the process. That activity was mimicked by a cadre of young volunteers whose free labor brought balance to a race in which O’Rourke’s campaign, which had one full-time employee, itself raised less than half of the money Reyes’ had.
From that experience, the victorious candidate and his advisers generated their own creation myth, in which interpersonal contact, rather than the persuasive power of mass media, drove his success. “Part of our DNA is: If you’re not at the doors, you’re not winning a race,” Susie Byrd, a former City Council colleague of O’Rourke who was active in his campaigns, has told the Texas Observer.
After two terms in Congress, O’Rourke decided to use that story and aim even higher, taking on another incumbent with visible weaknesses: Senator Ted Cruz, a fierce conservative who was deeply personally unpopular and had been damaged by a messy national primary battle with Donald Trump. After the 2016 election, O’Rourke asked his congressional chief of staff, David Wysong, to design a strategy for dislodging Cruz, and the door-knocking aesthetic became central to the campaign’s self-concept.
Wysong is a jovial former health care executive who served as volunteer campaign manager of the 2012 race. He has no experience in politics beyond service to his friend Beto, and remains unusual among campaign decision-makers for a willingness to express uncertainty, ignorance, even self-doubt. As he set out to plan a statewide run for O’Rourke, Wysong studied two national campaign organizations that were both blessed and cursed with massive enthusiasm among volunteers and donors, and attempted to corral that enthusiasm in very different ways.
The first were Obama’s presidential campaigns, which are treated as the reference standard for high-tech, lo-fi electioneering. Their field organizations relied on a trapezoidal structure in which thousands of staffers managed one another. At the bottom was the field organizer, assigned to oversee an office—typically a rented storefront designed to serve as a convivial communal hub for volunteers. The core unit for their work was the neighborhood team, composed of members who lived near one another. Each team was managed by a field organizer whose success was measured by the number of volunteers recruited and trained by the teams under her command. The objective was to make an official, staffed campaign outpost so ubiquitous—in 2012, Ohio alone had 131 of them—that volunteers would be lured in for frequent shifts of localized activity. Campaign officials called it “the Starbucks model.”
The Obama organizations had enough money and time that they didn’t have to make major trade-offs between their depth in communities and the breadth of their reach, but like most campaigners, Wysong knew he would be forced to choose. “The thing with Texas is, there’s just an endless supply of targets that you literally will never get to. Would I love to hit them all? Yes. I would. At the same time, I don’t know that I could ever have enough money to get there,” he said. “This is going to take a massive operation fieldwise that we could never afford through a typical way.”
He found much more to borrow from the 2016 presidential primary campaign of Bernie Sanders, who had neither the time nor the predictability to erect such a rigid national structure. The crucial early states of Iowa and New Hampshire monopolized official resources, while other states—whose primaries and caucuses Sanders was not sure he would survive to contest—were forced to make do with little. Beyond the early-voting states, the campaign found ardent volunteers but could not provide staffers to manage or offices to house them. A bold, and potentially risky, solution came from Zack Exley and Becky Bond, two longtime left-wing activists who came to the Sanders campaign with a well-developed skepticism of their side’s traditional organizing tactics. The only way to quickly bring a mass movement up to scale, they believed, was to skip the patient drudgery of professional organizing and adopt a decentralized approach. “In the current social context, people don’t need to be awakened politically—they are ready to get to work to make change,” they wrote in Rules for Revolutionaries: How Big Organizing Can Change Everything, a memoir-cum-manifesto about the Sanders experience and its lessons. “The revolution will be led by volunteer leaders who take on the work of a campaign plan, a plan that is so big it can only be accomplished when everyone who wants change (a majority of the people) works together.”
Texas was one of the states where their big-organizing model was most fully adopted. Phone banks to identify and mobilize supporters were run not out of campaign offices, but volunteers’ homes, enabled by technology that hadn't existed when Obama first ran for president. Instead of just contacting voters in their immediate area, calls were routed wherever an automated dialer found a live line. Volunteers managed one another and solved problems through a help desk that communicated via Slack; many graduated into leadership roles without ever interacting with a campaign employee. Reviewing the results, analysts determined that the volunteers were as productive as staffers.
The digital director of Sanders' Texas effort was Malitz, and as Beto O’Rourke’s campaign took shape, Bond suggested to Wysong that he was the right person to translate and update its lessons to a Senate race. Wysong, who became the campaign chief, appointed Malitz to a position with broad authority over field organizing, data and analytics. For the duration of the campaign, O’Rourke operated with an unusual two-headed structure: the Austin-based Wysong oversaw field and voter-contact operations, while campaign manager Jody Casey, also a political neophyte, worked in El Paso, handling functions like advance and communications more closely tied to the candidate.
O’Rourke, who spent part of his 20s touring as a member of the band Foss, often spoke of bringing a punk rock sensibility to electioneering, and the valorized amateurism of the big-organizing approach fit well. The candidate spent much of his time behind the wheel of his minivan, often addressing voters live through an iPhone, a homespun form of travel that obscured a sophisticated online-fundraising chassis hidden beneath. “Driving this Dodge Caravan across Texas, it’s just us driving ourselves,” O’Rourke would say after one campaign stop in Midland. “There’s no private jet, no consultant, no pollster saying this is the message you have to say to this group or that.”
That just-folks aesthetic fit well with the door-knocking mythology favored by O’Rourke’s El Paso circle, and together they pointed to an overarching strategy for the campaign. Wysong defined a path to victory entirely reliant on turnout, one in which a campaign’s energies would be overwhelmingly dedicated to identifying and mobilizing unreliable left-leaning voters. If he stuck to that plan, O’Rourke would never even have to hire a pollster, because he did not really care about moving opinions. There would be no triangulating against his party’s base, no judicious courtship of a relatively small slice of potential party-switchers with views to the right of his. “I was never super-infatuated that there are enough votes there to win,” Wysong said. “There’s not a million persuadable votes in the middle. Not even close.”
But it meant that O’Rourke needed enthusiastic volunteers and donors—lots of them, and quickly.
The vast majority of the voters O’Rourke would eventually have to mobilize had probably never previously been contacted by a campaign. As a result, when O’Rourke launched his field program in late 2017, it chose to not even work from a database of registered voters, the typical starting point. Instead, Malitz and his team sent out volunteers with instructions to stop at every address, knock blindly on the door and ask any adults behind it whether they backed Beto.
The indiscriminate nature of this assignment meant canvassers were visiting a lot of homes, even if the people who lived in many of them would never vote for O’Rourke — whether loyal Republicans or noncitizens. By the standards of modern campaigning this was wildly inefficient work, but the Sanders campaign alumni saw it as good practice for amateurs. “The beginning of canvassing is learning to be good at canvassing,” said Bond, a Californian who joined the campaign as a senior adviser. “The easiest thing was to just go out where you live and knock on doors, not travel to some office and then go out on this very specific turf in a neighborhood you might not know.”
When they found a supporter, volunteers asked for a name on what the campaign called a commit-to-vote sheet and pushed to get a cellphone number alongside it. Each voter they identified as a Beto supporter was treated not just as a voter, but as a potential volunteer. Starting in mid-December, the campaign’s small field staff of seven organizers started calling through its list of supporters, inviting them to come together in person for the first time to watch Beto himself greet them on video livestream. More than 200 agreed to host gatherings on January 13, and thousands of others attended. When the Facebook Live link went active, viewers saw O’Rourke on his living-room couch, strumming an acoustic guitar as his family sang along to George Strait’s “Amarillo by Morning.”
O’Rourke dismissed his three kids to play basketball outside, killing the hootenanny vibe. Now in fireside-chat mode, O’Rourke talked a bit about the history of his El Paso home, his grounding in the “binational community” that spanned the Rio Grande to Ciudad Juárez, and the nine months he spent knocking on neighbors’ doors during his first run for Congress. “It was this beautiful, powerful, slow-building door-by-door wave that allowed us to connect with those whom we wanted to serve and represent. So I’m not going to ask you to do anything that I have not done,” O’Rourke said, as his wife, Amy, eased back into the frame. “Do not worry if you have never done this before. The days of campaign pros dictating how campaigns are run are over.”
After O’Rourke was finished with his pitch, hosts distributed sheets where attendees would sign up to host their own phone banks or canvassing shifts. Field organizers shifted their attention to coaching the hosts, meeting with them individually or in small groups for training, so that they could invert the roles—volunteers taking on management duties and full-time employees offering mere support. This approach was so unusual that it strained their event-organizing system, a piece of software designed by Blue State Digital, a firm known for its work on Obama’s campaigns. As the database struggled to handle events led by volunteers rather than staff, the campaign saw entire events, and the RSVPs submitted for them, disappear into the digital ether. This would become a pattern as the campaign grew, as software designed for more conventional campaigns buckled under the demands of a hyperscale approach.
When the events were successfully launched, staff organizers would try to recruit attendees to lead the next one. They would take a list of self-identified supporters, narrow it to nearby ZIP codes and begin calling. “We worked all week to get seven volunteers for each of our individual, staff-run block walks, and then we spent all Thursday and Friday making confirmation calls. Like hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of phone calls to get a couple of people to turn out,” said Katherine Pineda, who became a regional field director for Southeast Texas. “We worked really hard for each volunteer.”
The process was generating new volunteer leaders, but at a pace too languorous to satisfy the anticipated demand. Malitz liked to say, “we gotta hit home runs,” and the existing system were more like singles—progress, but unsatisfyingly gradual. “We were just really frustrated with the rate of growth,” said Malitz. “It just was not getting big enough.”
The imperative was always to optimize the campaign for scale rather than precision. By the start of summer, the field team engineered a major shift, freeing organizers from a geographical base and having them share recruitment duties for block walks and phone banks held across the state, in the spirit of the distributed-organizing tactics pioneered by Sanders. Their tool was the Beto Dialer, a phone system developed by the firm Relay that queued up respondents to minimize the seconds that a caller spent waiting for a live voice to answer. It could make more efficient use of staff time, but at the cost of making accountability diffuse: No longer could responsibility for a poorly attended event be squarely placed on the nearest organizer. And for some organizers, it was a jarring adjustment to be calling a stranger in Lubbock one moment and another in San Marcos the next, all while a volunteer in Texarkana recruits people to attend a block walk near your office.
As it grew, the Beto for Senate field program regularly turned to methods that most campaign tacticians would find aimless. There was no mechanism for routing volunteers to unvisited areas, so volunteers were likely walking the same blocks over and over again. The field team rejected, too, advances in data analytics that modern campaigns typically embrace to narrow the range of voters with whom they interact, and perhaps tailor their communications to different groups. When the campaign did finally hire a firm to work on data projects, it selected TargetSmart, which serves primarily as a wholesale provider of voter data rather than a consultancy working on bespoke projects for clients. Casey, the campaign manager, was so sensitive to the idea that she might be paying for something that would violate O’Rourke’s vow not to hire a pollster that TargetSmart began referring to the survey calls necessary for any micro-targeting project as “model training data collection.”
Up until August, the campaign’s objective was to contact all but the most reliably Republican voters in the state, see if they supported Beto, and then cultivate them as prospective volunteers. Hard-core Republicans were excluded only to save existing supporters from potentially unpleasant interactions. “Literally, it could be such a bad experience,” said Malitz. Only then did the campaign narrow its range of potential targets to Texans identified as likely to support O’Rourke.
At the outset, Wysong planned around a modest statewide budget—“It felt like if we could get to $20 million, we could probably hang,” he said—that would require the field operation to be both very fast and very cheap. But O’Rourke’s dynamic digital presence turned out to be ideal for bringing in money. National party committees were still writing him off as too much of a long shot to fund, but small-dollar donors took to O’Rourke’s candidacy, especially as he associated himself with positions—Trump’s impeachment, abolishing ICE, likening the criminal-justice system to Jim Crow—that few other Democratic Senate contenders were willing to touch.
The campaign raised a remarkable $10 million in the second quarter of the year—more than twice what Cruz did. Wysong came back to Malitz with a request: Could he prepare a plan for what a field staff would look like at four times the current size? Earlier in 2018, Malitz had been turning away qualified applicants he wanted to hire. Now he became quickly desperate for anyone, regardless of pedigree or skill set. On September 29, Malitz set a de facto cutoff for new hires, concluding that “we’d grown to as large as we were going to get.” He had 821 staffers under his command by then, enormous for a statewide campaign. (It was about one-fifth the size of the Obama reelection’s entire national payroll, and a significant share of those employees had been in jobs unrelated to field work.)
On top of that was the army of volunteers, impossible to count and still growing at a quick clip. At the beginning of October, Malitz decided, it was time to stop the open-ended hunt for potential Beto sympathizers and make the inevitable shift to getting out the vote. All future contact would be only with people presumed to be supporters, one at a time, in the most expansive state in the continental U.S.
On Sunday, October 21, Malitz met Bond for breakfast at the Hideaway, a restaurant attached to one of the many hotels ridging Interstate 35 in South Austin. The previous day, the two had taken a little tour of some of pop-ups, the temporary campaign offices that volunteers were asked to set up in their own properties. Most of the nearly 800 locations around the state ended up in homes, for which the campaign had set a few prerequisites: a dedicated space open to strangers, an accessible bathroom and Wi-Fi. When Malitz and Bond spotted the Hideaway listed on a map of pop-ups, they were intrigued.
“Is this the bar of the Ramada Inn?” Bond had asked as Malitz pulled his pickup into the parking lot.
They entered to the soundtrack of a live four-piece blues band, and walked through the restaurant with a sense of wonder. The Beto for Senate office was tucked into a small room just around the corner from the bar, outfitted with technology provided by the campaign: a slew of Chromebooks, cheap cellphones, a pair of printers. It was scheduled to be open to volunteers 12 hours each day. When Malitz had first visited, the day before, the volunteer managing the office nervously informed him that the evening phone-bank shift might have to be cut short. Neighboring rooms, he explained, were scheduled to host a bachelorette dinner and a birthday celebration expected to feature Indian dancing.
Both Malitz and Bond wanted to fulfill a canvass shift in person over the weekend, and Sunday afternoon—when large numbers of Texans could be expected to be at home watching pro football—was the most appealing time. When they went online to sign up for one, both said they would do so from the Hideaway. Malitz arrived for breakfast wearing all black except for the white panel of his Beto for Senate trucker hat. Over breakfast tacos and vegetable hash, he and Bond reviewed the weekend’s activity.
They had set a statewide goal of contacting 200,000 people over the course of the final weekend before voters would get their first chance to cast a ballot. Texas’ early-voting rules include an 11-day period during which voters can show up at any number of designated centers in their home county; it starts two weeks before Election Day and ends several days before. The previous day had ended with 89,208 total contacts—an increase from the previous Saturday’s 70,000 but still short of the pace they’d set. The goals were conceived rather arbitrarily—ambitious enough to offer motivation, plausible enough that they could be met—but they instilled a sense of drama and gave the weekend a narrative arc. Malitz ordered a cold-brew coffee and checked his phone again. By 11:22 a.m., only partway through what was typically the weekend’s slowest shift, canvassers had knocked on 8,252 doors statewide since sunrise. Two months earlier, the campaign had celebrated breaking 20,000 in an entire day.
Malitz expected his field staff to sign up for volunteer shifts, instructing them “we will eat our own dog food,” and in that spirit several of his colleagues had come to the Hideaway that morning, as well. As she waited for the noon shift to begin, Emily Guzman Sufrin opened her laptop to monitor some of the conversations that volunteers were already having with voters. Sufrin’s prior job had been far from politics, as a curatorial assistant helping to put on the Whitney Biennial contemporary-art exhibition in New York, but she had grown frustrated with the small real-world impact she could have at a museum. She made plans to attend law school at the University of Texas, and while waiting to enroll, volunteered for O’Rourke’s campaign. Within weeks she was offered a job. Sixty percent of the field organizers that would be hired had never before been involved in an electoral campaign; three-quarters had not worked as a staffer on one. “We didn't hire people with political experience,” said Malitz. “We just hired true believers who are brand-new to politics.”
Sufrin was repeatedly promoted, and by early summer had become the campaign’s deputy distributed-organizing director. That put her in charge of the text-messaging unit, which had started the previous November and reached full capacity much more quickly than the phone-banking or block-walking programs. Federal laws forbid automated texting, so the button to send each message has to be pressed manually. The campaign loads in mobile numbers from one of its databases, and a volunteer, who commits to a shift of 1,000 messages at a time, customizes them to feature her name (“Hi, this is Emily from the Beto for Senate campaign”) and then taps her laptop to fire off dozens per minute.
The campaign found that a texter was 10 times more likely to get a response than a caller is to complete a conversation, and that’s where the management challenge comes in. Someone who asks a stranger via text message if he or she supports Beto can invite ripostes that are wild and varied—and an exchange potentially without end. “We’re not working on persuasion,” Sufrin would instruct her team. “Respond, but don’t find a pen pal.”
Sufrin logged onto the Slack channel where the all-volunteer texting force traded notes on their work. They had organized themselves into a self-governing colony, with a variety of different official roles, with power derived from the ability of volunteer managers to surveil what their charges were doing at every moment. “We don’t know what people are saying on the phones or at the doors, but we have a unique ability to look in,” she said. Thus far on Sunday morning, things seemed to be going smoothly. The biggest troubleshooting question from one texter: “Somebody just told me they’re voting for Willie Nelson. What should I do?”
Malitz left the Hideaway and drove 10 minutes to a residential neighborhood known as Franklin Park. As soon as he parked, his phone buzzed with a call from O’Rourke himself. Malitz paced the block as he provided the candidate with an update on the weekend’s field activity. “He’s done a lot of this,” Malitz said as he grabbed a clipboard from the backseat of his truck before heading down Atascosa Drive on foot. His stroll was accompanied by an ominous soundtrack: the grating calliope of an ice-cream truck and military planes zipping overhead as part of the flyover at a nearby Formula One track. On a nice autumnal Saturday afternoon, no one appeared to be home, except at the one address where two freshly opened bottles of Corona sat near the doorstep and inside could be heard the telltale sounds of someone avoiding an unwanted visitor.
Malitz clearly wasn’t the only person who had recently walked these streets in vain pursuit of voters. At one home, Malitz came across a get-out-the-vote leaflet left by a canvasser from Jolt Texas, an independent group recently formed to increase Latino participation. Malitz studied the Jolt piece, which pictured its endorsees, all Democrats, including O’Rourke and gubernatorial nominee Lupe Valdez. He appreciated the irony that the independent-expenditure committee was distributing glossy photos of his candidate, while the Beto for Senate handbills piled in his palm included no material about its namesake or his program—but lots of dense detail about how exactly to cast a ballot.
At his seventh door, Malitz found his first target, a 25-year-old Latina named Linette. She proved a puzzling case: She insisted she was certain to vote, even though some of the basics seemed foreign to her. “How is it?” she asked Malitz. “Is it a quiz or something? Do you write in multiple questions? Or it’s just like Beto or whoever?” Linette had not recognized O’Rourke’s name when her visitor first mentioned it. Malitz responded only that “Beto is a Democratic member of Congress who is going for U.S. Senate against Ted Cruz.” Once she said she preferred Democrats, he didn’t bother trying to shape her choice. Instead he focused on the rudiments of voting: where and when to go, what documents to bring, the differences between voting early and on Election Day.
At the last stop on his route, Malitz asked the woman who answered the doorbell if she was named Kim. The woman didn’t respond directly. “Se habla español?” she inquired.
“Oh, no hablo,” Malitz responded sheepishly. “Lo siento.”
The woman’s name was Rocío, and she and Malitz went back and forth for several minutes typing into a translation app on her phone, with an intermittent OK to signal understanding. Frustrated by the slow pace, Malitz dialed Sufrin. “Can I put you on the phone with a voter to have a conversation in Spanish?” he asked her.
Malitz turned on the speakerphone and introduced the two. Rocío told Sufrin it was her first election season, but that she was not a citizen. When Sufrin told her she could help motivate her acquaintances, Rocío said her entire family, too, had resident status. “You can’t vote, obviously, because it’s not legal,” Sufrin told her in Spanish. “But you can volunteer. We need help.”
Walking from door to door did not appeal to Rocío, but she responded more favorably to the suggestion of joining a Spanish-language phone bank. Malitz wrote down the address of the campaign headquarters in North Austin, and she promised to be there the next morning for a training at 9 a.m.
When that hour arrived, Malitz and Sufrin were rallying colleagues for the brief trip to Austin Community College, the early-voting location closest to the campaign headquarters. After casting their ballots, they joined together for a series of hugs and selfies. “It’s been a really long time,” muttered Emily Sufrin, in tears. “God, I hope we win.” As they exited the student center to take a group picture outside, one hint of their work thus far had become apparent: What had been a line of 18 people waiting to vote upon their arrival was now about 75 deep. Within a few hours, a video of the line snaking through the atrium had begun to circulate online—part of a swelling signal of what appeared to be a major turnout surge in Texas’ largest cities.
It became quickly clear that this was no ordinary midterm election in Texas. Over the first week of the early-voting period, turnout exceeded the number of people who had voted early in all of 2014; in some areas, the figures were comparable to totals from the 2012 presidential election. Republican strategists didn’t panic at what seemed like good news for Democrats. Over the course of the year, Ted Cruz’s advisers had been revising their turnout estimates upward, after their polls showed high interest and intensity among prospective voters. Their data told them that increases in midterm turnout would not necessarily help O’Rourke: Analysis showed a majority of the 8 million or so previously inactive voting-age Texans were statistically more likely to resemble Republicans. “This idea that nonvoters are Democrats is nuts,” said Dave Carney, the chief strategist to Governor Greg Abbott.
When it came to mobilizing turnout on the Republican side, Cruz was heavily relying on Abbott, who as governor had the more formidable Texas political machine. Abbott never really shut down his campaign organization after being elected in 2014 and could raise money for it more freely under Texas laws than a Senate candidate could. For 18 months, even though his reelection was never in doubt, Abbott had been placing field organizers in locations selected to boost the prospects of legislative candidates. “It just made more sense for us to push our people there and know that it would be done in a good way, than it would be to try and compete with them,” said Jeff Roe, Cruz’s campaign manager in 2016 and his chief strategist last year.
Roe’s strategy relied on the assumption that it wouldn’t help Cruz to mount an aggressive defense of his record. “Our entire plan was to make it about Beto as long as possible,” said Roe. “Just let the guy go.” What shocked Roe was how readily O’Rourke obliged. The challenger made no attempts to capture defectors from the unpopular incumbent and only the most diffuse, gauzy efforts to swing undecided voters his way. Over the course of the year, the seeming uninterest from O’Rourke’s campaign in that project of persuasion went, in the eyes of Cruz’s advisers, from a matter of curiosity to befuddlement to disdain. Roe, who despite being one of the Republican Party’s most coveted strategists keeps a sideline as a baseball umpire, likened the competition to Little League baseball.
When O’Rourke’s team released his Plan to Win in mid-September, with its bold ambition to remake the electorate by drawing out a million new voters, Roe studied it long enough to know he did not need to take it seriously. The numerical goal ran afoul of a Roe axiom to distrust round numbers on activity reports. (“Always add a 12 or something to it and make it look real,” one adviser had advised junior staffers.) “I think if they would have used a number that was more realistic, it would have meant more to me,” said Roe. That one integer, in his view, obscured a more monumental grandiosity. “The theory of his case is that he has to turn out Democrats and unusual voters, and the Republicans can’t turn out,” he said. “Our theory of the case is: We need every Republican to go vote.”
By contrast with O’Rourke, Texas Republicans hewed to a familiar model of what a sophisticated, well-drilled modern campaign ought to look like, prizing precision and efficiency. The governor’s advisers had launched what they called Abbott University, a series of four-hour seminars led by two full-time trainers and usually conducted in tandem with local Republican clubs. They’d excised the use of phone calls for voter contact after conducting a round of experiments during the 2014 campaign that called into question their efficiency. They did still send volunteers to doorsteps, which required more work but had more impact on voter behavior. Their list of targets had been shaped by statistical models that pinpointed unreliable midterm voters open to backing the governor, or soft supporters whom he needed to shore up. Among the firm Abbott supporters, Cruz’s campaign had identified 386,000 likely voters who were uncommitted in the Senate race, and made them a focal point of its digital persuasion.
Roe’s opinion of his opponent’s tactical sophistication was shaped in large part by the fact that an O’Rourke canvasser had knocked on the door of his Houston home. (He was away at the time.) It was a matter of public record that Roe had cast a ballot in that year’s Republican primary. A campaign that didn’t know that fact lacked basic database skills; one that knew it and visited his home anyway was too desperate to intelligently remake the electorate the way its Plan to Win said would be necessary. “If there was an organizational theory behind the way that they’re approaching it, then I would worry more,” Roe said. “He doesn't have the size and strength of an operation to sustain this.”
At the end of one week of early voting, O’Rourke’s data team projected it was winning 50.1 percent of the votes that had been cast already, although when models distributed the remaining votes, it pushed his expected total lower. Those numbers didn’t feed a sense of optimism so much as they staved off despair. If O’Rourke had been doomed to the steep loss many pundits had predicted, the early-vote data would likely have looked much worse. “We’re doing what we need to,” Malitz said.
But the uncharacteristically large numbers of Texans who voted early posed new problems for O’Rourke’s field team. Populous counties released daily lists of those voters who had cast ballots, and each night data analysts would strike them from O’Rourke’s list of 5.5 million turnout targets. That number shrinking was good news—fewer voters left to reach—but those who remained would become harder to reach. Neighborhoods once dense with lots of doors to knock on would start to thin out, turning them increasingly inefficient to canvass and frustrating those who spent a lot more time walking without human interaction. “If we get to a point where we completed let’s say 90 percent of our universe, we create a horrible, horrible volunteer experience for the canvassers,” Malitz said.
How to solve what became known as the “shitty-turf problem” vexed Malitz’s team. Shutting down the pop-up offices near the well-trodden turf might push volunteers to go farther afield, but it could also kill off what were, by definition, some of the highest-functioning field offices. Already local managers took the initiative to organize a caravan of 28 volunteers showing up for shifts in Houston Heights, an area populated by younger white activist-types, and send them 10 minutes east to Kashmere Gardens, a largely African-American neighborhood chockablock with untouched targets. On a nightly conference call with volunteers—as many as 300 at a time dialing in to hear a mix of pep talk and tactical update—Malitz suggested that pop-up managers be trained to send volunteers to picked-over areas in automotive pairs. With one driver and a passenger who could quickly exit to knock doors, such “sweeper teams” could also serve put to work canvassers wary about being out alone, especially at night.
With another big weekend of canvassing ahead, Malitz suggested releasing all the doors that had already been knocked but whose residents had yet to vote, back into the pool of targets. He mused, too, about setting a trigger, so that once, say, a precinct hit, say, 75 percent coverage all those visited doors would be automatically made available again for future canvassers.
A field program with a more traditional approach could have avoided such complications through an orderly parceling out of canvass assignments to areas with the greatest density of unknocked doors. But the campaign’s distributed-organizing system, with its loose, untargeted nature, left the field program still bent toward flexibility and growth over precision. Even as he encouraged that fast growth, Wysong worried that it could become too profligate. “How can we make that system more efficient?” he asked. “And if we can’t get all the inefficiencies out of it, how do we turn those inefficiencies away from costs to the campaign?”
The way of applying this calculus came by puzzling out an answer to a seemingly simple question: Does this net votes? There were many things a campaign did with sensible motives—an aspiration toward perfectionism or thoroughness, perhaps, or consideration of staff or volunteer esteem—that did not necessarily result in improved performance on election night. At a staff summit in late August, Malitz had introduced the concept, an invitation to cast a coldly economistic eye on the impact and value of what they did every day. “Net votes” became a mantra for field organizers, chanted at staff meetings and also subject of its own Slack emoji.
Staples of campaign organization were unsentimentally discarded. Malitz decided to scrap the whole reporting structure in which field organizers provided productivity metrics on shifts and contacts every three hours to their managers, those managers consolidated the numbers for their regional directors, and so on. As organizing director, Malitz would now have no idea which sectors were most productive, or where a given staffer might be slacking off. But by scrapping all the reporting obligations, he could free up the time of managers to solve problems rather than constantly monitoring for them. “It was a whole lot of process that made us feel busy,” he said, “but didn’t really translate to netting votes.”
As Election Day grew near, calculations about net-vote efficiency grew even more ruthless. Offering voters transportation to polling places was a venerable part of any get-out-the-vote program, and O’Rourke’s campaign reflexively set up a drive-to-the-polls program, but from the outset it seemed to exist as an obligation rather than an opportunity. Very few voters were reliant on campaign-supplied rides, but the organization necessary to take and track their requests was remarkably demanding. On October 29, after weeks of unsatisfying deliberations, Malitz decided to shut down the drive-to-the-polls program entirely—a decision that risked blowback from voters who took the service for granted, or local party activists who saw it as a dereliction of a basic duty. “This is so we can net more votes doing things that are more efficient than offering rides,” Malitz explained to his team at their midday meeting.
He already knew what he had in mind, turning the conversation toward the weekend ahead of them, the final one of the campaign. He had puzzled for days over what kind of goal to set for the weekend, an arbitrary figure that gained totemic power among active supporters through its repetition in email blasts, social-media posts and the nightly volunteer conference coals. Malitz proposed a goal of 1 million doors, spread across the final four days of the election, from dawn on Saturday to poll-closing time on Tuesday.
The previous weekend, the campaign had fallen well short of its weekend goal of 400,000 doors. At least some of the blame could be attributed to an outage of the canvassing app Polis, which had kept volunteers idle over much of the Sunday afternoon canvass shift. As with the event-planning snafu earlier in the year, O’Rourke’s team discovered only through agonizing experience the extent of the technological catch-22 they had created for themselves: The proven tools of modern electioneering weren’t built for the kind of campaign that O'Rourke was trying to run, while those better-suited to his abnormal tactics had never been tested under pressure at such scale. (“We hadn’t accounted for them having 5,000 people in the same park all heading out to knock doors at the same time,” Polis CEO Kendall Tucker said later. “It was a real challenge.”) “Not hitting goals sucks,” Katelyn Coghlan wrote to field staff in a Slack message the next morning. “Always be honest with the volunteers about these things. It’s OK to tell them that Polis broke because we knocked so many doors so quickly, that it sucked, that it’s fixed, and that we need them to keep knocking.”
One million doors was by any measure a staggering objective over a four-day stretch. As soon as it left his mouth, the number was met by gasps and giggles. “Honestly, no one is going to know whether we hit or miss the goal, because the news out of Tuesday will be the election,” he conceded to his staff. “The point of goals is to motivate people.”
That staggering goal offered context for the most significant topic of discussion about the final weekend. Wysong told Malitz that O’Rourke was willing to spend those days doing whatever the field department decided would best help reach their goals, so Malitz put it to his team: What should we do with Beto?
The least imaginative answer would be a series of get-out-the-vote rallies to stoke supporters just before Election Day and catalyze local media attention, online buzz and word of mouth among others. A late September appearance in Austin with Willie Nelson, during which O’Rourke joined the headliner on several songs, drew a reported 55,000 people—more than either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump were reported to have had at any of their 2016 rallies. With an impressive roster of celebrity fans, including LeBron James and Béyoncé, it was not difficult to imagine O’Rourke replicating or exceeding the Austin attendance in a number of Texas’ large cities.
The field department had leapt at the offer to control the candidate’s schedule at the start of the early-vote period. They had developed “Vote With Beto” events near early-vote centers and college campuses when they hosted mobile polling places. In those cases, the campaign was using the candidate’s appeal as bait, drawing supporters out to a location at a time when they could be trapped by enthusiasm or social expectation to immediately line up for a ballot. But there were no opportunities for Texans to vote in person over the final weekend. Malitz resisted the opportunity to build events around O’Rourke then, fearing they would draw supporters away from the more productive activity of knocking on doors.
He invited his team to generate ideas for how O’Rourke could be used to foster productive volunteer activity rather than detract from it. He could lead a conference call or livestream to kick off each canvass shift, an incentive for volunteers to complete their shifts and return to pop-up locations for a communal experience, or attend select canvass kickoffs in person. What if he livestreamed his own canvassing, and turned it into a statewide game, where volunteers competed to knock more doors than Beto? He could read off names of people who committed to volunteer shifts, or critique others’ canvassing techniques. Supporters could be invited to submit their friends’ phone numbers, as part of a lottery where Beto would make recruitment calls to them, all on the livestream.
Malitz wrote each of the ideas down in a notebook, immediately dismissing a number of them according to a net-votes calculus. The various livestream ideas were appealing, but too much activity—in the form of games, contest, entertainment—could induce supporters to spend their days as spectators rather than participants. Events involving O’Rourke himself could certainly draw out new volunteers, but if the campaign pulled them all to a single location it lacked a mechanism to efficiently send them back out to the neighborhoods where it hoped to see them canvass. If he went anywhere supporters could find him, he would also draw a large media contingent, which would put logistical demands on his field staff. O’Rourke would be less bait than a decoy, drawing people and resources that could be put to far more efficient use elsewhere. “I’m going to lob all these over to Wysong and see what he thinks is a good idea,” said Malitz.
Wysong decided to take the country’s biggest new political celebrity and effectively send him underground for the biggest weekend of the year. When O’Rourke began Saturday morning by turning on Facebook Live from a phone affixed to the dashboard of his minivan, the Dallas skyline was visible through the rear windshield. But the candidate said nothing more about his destination. “The band is back, we’re in the van, and we’re gonna go do some block-walking,” O’Rourke said, from behind a pair of garishly orange sunglasses handed out by the fast-food chain Whataburger. (A total of 46,000 people ended up watching this part of O’Rourke’s day on Facebook Live.) Joined by his wife and a pair of staffers, with his children and other family members trailing in another vehicle, O’Rourke never identified where in Dallas he spent the day canvassing; later in the day he drove to Plano, and knocked on doors there.
Only at night, after the final shift of the day had ended, did O’Rourke attend a public event, a Blockwalk Celebration at a Dallas record store, where field organizers would welcome those who volunteered on Saturday and try to recommit them for shifts on Sunday and beyond. The next day he did the same thing in Austin and San Antonio. It was a perverse manifestation of the mobilization-over-persuasion dynamic that had grounded much of the campaign’s strategy since its outset. The only way for local stations to feature the candidate on their evening newscasts that weekend, typically an obsession of communications staffers seeking a last chance to reach late-deciding voters, was to use grainy, message-free homemade video of him walking suburban sidewalks.
A few people in the field room kept a muted Facebook Live window open on their computers while tending to other tasks, occasionally sharing updates with colleagues on O’Rourke’s canvassing movements. “The beauty of what’s happening now is it doesn’t have any effect on the field operation,” said Malitz, “so we can do our thing."
When the votes were counted on election night, the final tally showed O’Rourke had lost by just over 2 points. It was a far narrower margin than most pundits and handicappers had anticipated, which gave rise to a sense both inside and outside the campaign that even in electoral defeat O’Rourke could claim to have accomplished something remarkable.
Since Election Day, Wysong has been making the rounds of Democratic Party elites to discuss the 2018 campaign and whether it represents a useful foundation for O’Rourke to mount a presidential bid in 2020.
Total turnout was above 8.3 million, a number much closer to what would be expected in a presidential election than a midterm year. (More Texans voted in the 2018 Senate race than in the 2008 presidential election, although the state has had a fast-growing population over that decade.) “Did we accomplish historical voter turnout in Texas? Yes. Was it enough to put us over the top? No,” Malitz shrugged two days after the election, as his team was emptying out its offices before leases expired. “It’s politics in the age of Trump. Historical data only means so much.”
O’Rourke’s advisers are nearing a more precise verdict about their performance. Last month, they received updated electoral rolls that indicated, at a personal level, how many of the 5.6 million voters they had named as turnout targets actually cast ballots. When he had toured the state giving his Plan to Win presentation in September, Malitz had told supporters that if they brought 1 million new Democratic voters into the midterm electorate they should be able to win. The updated voter rolls are likely to demonstrate that goal was met, and that it still was not enough to win. If that is the case, it is the campaign’s strategy, rather than its tactics, that deserve scrutiny.
Wysong has indicated that he recognizes some of the methods that defined O’Rourke’s unconventional campaign style will not translate to the type of presidential nominating competition that awaits him if he chooses to run for president. (Wysong could not be reached this week to discuss those deliberations, or the prospect of another Senate bid for O’Rourke against Republican incumbent John Cornyn.) Primary campaigns, especially those with as large and variegated a field as Democrats expect, have to be overwhelmingly about persuasion, and the elevation of small differences into the stuff of voter choices. Even if O’Rourke insists a pollster won’t tell him which positions to stake out, it is hard to imagine intelligently drawing sharp distinctions across potentially two dozen rivals without one who can quantify their strengths and vulnerabilities. Campaigns will want to use data and modeling tools to “slice and dice” the electorate, to use Bond’s pejorative term, to identify which voters fit in their coalitions, and how best to engage with them.
Wysong could still decide to empower his field team to develop the type of big-organizing operation that thrived in Texas, with its preference for flexibility and scale over precision and accountability. It would be well-suited to grow quickly at moments when O’Rourke’s candidacy surges, and the rejection of geographic hierarchies could make a squadron of well-drilled Texas volunteer callers and texters useful reaching voters in New Hampshire, South Carolina and California. But it would also demand patience that a primary candidate, constantly needing to justify his existence to party elites and media, may not be able to afford.
“It takes true belief in what we're building, and in the power of organizing to stick with it, knowing that there’s a hockey stick that you're not going to see until the end,” Malitz reflected just before Election Day. “The premise of investing in a big field program is you’re not going to see results that are commensurate with the scale of your investment until the very end, when it’s too late to change anything.”
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
The father of an Alabama woman who joined ISIS and is now seeking a return to the U.S. filed a lawsuit Thursday against President Donald Trump and other senior officials after the president said he had moved to bar her from reentry.
Ahmed Ali Muthana filed the lawsuit in Washington D.C. federal district court on behalf of Hoda Muthana, his daughter, who left Alabama in 2014 at the age of 19 and joined the terrorist group in Syria.
Muthana has claimed she is a U.S. citizen, but the Trump administration says her status as the daughter of a Yemeni diplomat means she is not a naturalized citizen and thus not entitled to the Constitutional rights of an American citizen.
Trump wrote on Twitter on Wednesday that he instructed Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to deny Muthana's reentry. Pompeo on Wednesday said in a statement that Muthana was not a U.S. citizen and had no “legal basis” to be brought back to the United States. Pompeo and Attorney General William Barr are also named in the suit.
The suit contests the State Department's position that Muthana is not a legal citizen, saying she and her son, identified as John Doe in court documents, should be able to return without interference.
According to the suit, Muthana's father was a diplomat for Yemen at the United Nations in New York, but he turned in his diplomatic card in June 1994. The family has produced documents that appear to show Hoda Muthana was born on October 28, 1994, in New Jersey, and at that time Ahmed Ali Muthana and his wife had applied for and been granted permanent resident status in the U.S. Therefore, the suit argues, Hoda Muthana would be a citizen at birth.
The suit claims Hoda Muthana was passport in 2004, that was renewed a decade later, when the government questioned whether she was eligible for a passport given her father's status, but after additional documents were produced, was granted one after all.
As a citizen at birth, Hoda Muthana would be entitled to the Constitutional protections. While there are instances where the government could then still revoke her citizenship, the process would be far more complicated.
For the time being, according to the suit, Hoda Muthana and her child are being held in Syria by Kurdish forces. According to the suit, Ahmed Ali Muthana seeks a ruling whereby it would be legal for him to provide financial support for their return trip, that the federal government be told they cannot deprive his daughter or his grandson of their Constitutional rights, and the government be reminded that it has "an obligation to assist in the return of its citizens from armed areas of conflict."
Hoda Muthana, the suit says, would also be willing to face any potential charges from the Justice Department related to her allegiance to ISIS. In her time overseas, she had married three ISIS fighters and used her Twitter account to spread their anti-American message.
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
A new study finds Americans of every stripe have a waning appetite for imperial adventurism overseas
While the nation was focused on a hoaxed hate crime, Brooklyn's Jews have been repeatedly and actually attacked for being Jewish.
The Justice Department has charged an IRS analyst with leaking confidential information about the banking transactions of Michael Cohen, President Donald Trump’s former longtime attorney, to the lawyer Michael Avenatti.
According to a federal complaint unsealed on Thursday, John C. Fry, who works in the IRS’ San Francisco office, downloaded multiple sensitive documents with Cohen’s private banking information on May 4, 2018, and quickly placed a call to a cellphone number associated with Avenatti. Fry was able to access those files, and additional ones he made after the call, because he assists IRS agents who review suspicious-activity reports — documents that banks and others are required by law to file when they are aware of a potentially suspicious financial transition. Cohen’s accounts had generated multiple such reports.
Cohen was Trump’s personal attorney in 2016 during the presidential campaign when he paid the adult-film actress Stormy Daniels $250,000 to stay quiet about an earlier affair she said she had with Trump. It was later discovered that this payment potentially violated campaign finance law. Avenatti last year filed a lawsuit on behalf of Daniels in her attempt to void a nondisclosure agreement about the alleged affair.
Late last year, Cohen was sentenced to three years in prison after pleading guilty to tax fraud and lying to Congress about work he did on a proposed Trump Tower in Moscow. Multiple investigators, including special counsel Robert Mueller and his team, are looking into whether Trump campaign officials helped Russia interfere in the 2016 election. Cohen is set to begin serving his sentence in May.
The federal complaint that was unsealed on Thursday says that Fry verbally admitted to federal investigators that he leaked the documents to Avenatti, and also made a written statement to the same effect. He faces a maximum of five years in prison and a fine of $250,000 if convicted of the unlawful disclosure of suspicious-activity reports.
Just four days after Fry accessed reports related to Cohen, the complaint alleges, Avenatti tweeted that Cohen had been paid $500,000 by a company linked to a Russian oligarch. The Russian-linked payment was routed through Essential Consultants, an LLC that Cohen also used to accept payments from companies like AT&T and Novartis in a bid to turn his status as Trump’s longtime fixer into cash as companies scrambled to understand the then-nascent administration. In a document posted on Twitter, Avenatti further outlined his claims, according to prosecutors.
Avenatti, according to the complaint, also gave information about the reports to The Washington Post for an article it published on May 8.
The information sparked a flurry of news reports, and AT&T, Novartis and other companies quickly confirmed their relationships with Cohen and issued conciliatory statements. But the source of the documents remained a mystery, a subject that received renewed interest after the New Yorker published a report by Ronan Farrow, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, that featured a “law enforcement official” who was going public with his motivation to leak the information.
The complaint, following traditional protocol, does not name Farrow, but describes a “Reporter-1” who published a piece for the New Yorker titled “Missing Files Motivated the Leak of Michael Cohen’s Financial Records” — leaving little doubt that Farrow is the journalist in question, since his is the sole byline on the article.
On Thursday evening, Avenatti, who was named in the indictment but who has not been charged with any wrongdoing, said he did nothing improper.
“Neither I nor R. Farrow did anything wrong or illegal with the financial info relating to Cohen’s crimes (the courts have found that the BSA does not apply — see below),“ Avenatti wrote on Twitter, referring to the Bank Secrecy Act. “And if we did (we didn’t), then every reporter in America would be jailed and unable to do their job.“
Fry was released on a $50,000 bond and is next scheduled to be in court on March 13.
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
Vice President Mike Pence has slowly become of the president’s most visible overseas surrogates — sent to deliver Trump’s “America First” demands.
On Monday, Pence will make his third speech on foreign soil in the last two weeks when he travels to Bogota, Columbia, to call on Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro to step aside, a high-profile address that will come as the world watches to see whether Maduro relents on a blockade that has kept humanitarian aid packages from Venezuelans facing food and medicine shortages.
The request will come just days after Pence took a swing through Europe, where he broadsided allies with an unexpected demand that they pull out of the Iranian nuclear deal, while chiding them for continuing to do business with the country. Pence pointedly reiterated the dictates in a second speech, even after being issued a flat denial the first time around.
On the foreign stage, White House officials say Pence has sometimes settled into a role as the administration’s bad cop, with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is the diplomat who sticks around to hash out particulars and the president is the showman who swoops in from time to time. And it’s a role Pence will likely continue to play in the next few months, as Trump’s schedule becomes increasingly campaign-focused.
It’s the latest example of the unique way the Trump administration conducts business — past vice presidents have been sent to overseas locales farther down the geopolitical priority list. But with Trump preferring domestic travel — and the ever-present potential for gaffes and protests when he does venture overseas — Pence has increasingly become the face of Trumpism abroad. To his supporters, Pence is seen as an powerful defender of the president’s agenda — someone who has not once veered from his script in a way that undermined Trump. But critics say Pence has done little more than exacerbate already tense relationships between the U.S. and allies by simply repeating Trump’s threats and grievances in a different tone.
“The vice president consults with the president before and during all of these major trips and he’s always delivering the message that the president wants him to deliver,” said former Pence press secretary Marc Lotter, who recently joined Trump’s 2020 operation.
Now, Pence is turning his focus to Venezuela, an issue where he has been at the front and center from the beginning for the Trump administration. Pence was the first senior Trump administration official to phone Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó the day before he declared himself interim president of the economically strapped country. In the weeks since, many Latin American countries and America’s EU allies have followed the U.S. government in recognizing Guaidó as the true Venezuelan leader.
And in his speech Monday, Pence plans to reaffirm “the United States’ unwavering support” for Guaidó just 48 hours after the opposition leader and more than 600,000 volunteers will attempt to bring humanitarian aid packages into the country that Maduro has been blocking at the border. Backed by a coalition of Latin American governments, Pence will declare that “the time has come for Nicolás Maduro to step aside,” the White House said Thursday.
It will be Pence’s fifth trip to Latin America since taking office.
“He wants to keep the drumbeat going,” a senior White House official told POLITICO, adding that both Pence and President Donald Trump believe the situation in Venezuela “could become the most significant foreign policy event of this administration.”
Venezuela is just one of myriad foreign policy issues Pence has folded into his portfolio.
Pence was the most senior official sent to a gathering on Middle East policy in Warsaw last week.
At the event, he diverged from his prepared remarks to call on the United States’ European partners “to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.” Trump announced last year that the U.S. would exit the agreement — in which Tehran pledged to curb its nuclear program in exchange for economic sanctions relief — calling it a disaster for America.
In Warsaw, Pence accused European allies of undermining U.S. sanctions that were reimposed against Iran after Trump abandoned the accord, though he declined to namecheck Germany, France, or Britain for launching a mechanism last month that’s designed to allow for continued trade with Iran. He reiterated the same talking points during a speech days later at the Munich Security Conference, an annual gathering of top leaders from around the world.
“It is an ill-advised step that will only strengthen Iran, weaken the [European Union] and create still more distance between Europe and the United States,” he said.
It was a moment that surprised foreign diplomats, who felt that Pence’s remarks might actually embolden Iran, giving its officials easy attack lines. Indeed, Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif referenced Pence’s Warsaw comments during his own speech in Munich.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel also picked up on the remarks, accusing the Trump administration of strengthening adversaries like Iran and Russia with its demands. Germany, France and the European Union had all declined to send their top diplomats to the Warsaw gathering.
The senior White House official said Pence’s fiery comments were meant to signal the administration’s move “toward a tougher stance against Iran, which includes pushing allies to withdraw” from the 2015 nuclear deal.
“The vice president used bilateral meetings in Munich and Warsaw to highlight not just the security threat posed by Iran,” said the official, but to also challenge European allies on their business with a regime that has been known to “stifle free speech, kill gay people and persecute political dissenters.”
Pence has also occasionally popped up as a key player in the Trump administration’s ongoing denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. It was his comparison of North Korea to Libya that drew fierce backlash from Pyongyang last May, temporarily jeopardizing a planned summit between Trump and Kim Jong Un — the showman aspect the president relishes. Trump will meet again with Kim next week in Vietnam for their second optics-heavy international summit.
Part of the reason Pence enjoys such autonomy on the foreign stage is due, in part, to his proficiency at weaving profuse Trump flattery into his appearances, according to a former White House official.
In Munich, for instance, Pence spoke Trump’s name 30 times, claiming at one point that “under President Donald Trump’s leadership, America is leading the free world once again.” In Warsaw, a transcript of Pence’s speech shows 16 mentions of Trump by name, with four additional references to “the president.” By comparison, then-Vice President Joe Biden mentioned President Barack Obama only once by name in his 2015 speech to the Munich Security Conference.
Behind the scenes, Pence has even worked with president on developing and messaging the Trump administration’s foreign policy agenda.
Following months and months of meetings with Christian leaders and national security experts, Pence successfully pressured administration officials at the U.S. Agency for International Development to funnel millions of dollars to Christian and Yazidi religious communities in Iraq that the Islamic State has decimated. The United Nations would have otherwise distributed the funds.
“I called it to [Trump’s] attention that we could bypass U.N. programs and fund religious-based NGOs directly,” Pence told the Wall Street Journal in a recent interview, adding that Trump agreed “on the spot.”
Pence is expected to remain mostly in the foreign policy lane as the 2020 campaign draws more of Trump’s attention and the administration works to broker a trade agreement with China and win Congress’ approval of its renegotiated trade deal with Canada and Mexico.
The vice president will help sell the U.S.-Canada-Mexico deal — which would update the NAFTA trade agreement — with Midwest swing in the coming weeks, according to two people familiar with his plans. The tour is expected to bring Pence to a host of farm towns and domestic manufacturing plants, where he will meet with small crowds and deliver remarks in an attempt to pressure Capitol Hill into swiftly passing the accord.
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
When Chicago police accused actor Jussie Smollett of fabricating a story about being attacked by MAGA-loving bigots, President Donald Trump was quick to weigh in. “What about MAGA and the tens of millions of people you insulted with your racist and dangerous comments!?” he wrote on Twitter.
And when Catholic high school student Nick Sandmann filed a lawsuit against The Washington Post this week over its coverage of last month’s confrontation between the teenager and a Native American elder, Trump couldn’t help himself. “Go get them Nick,” he declared. “Fake News!”
But more than 24 hours after news broke that a Coast Guard officer — an avowed white nationalist — was allegedly plotting to kill Democratic politicians and journalists, Trump has, at least so far, not said a word.
Asked for comment, White House spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee Sanders said, “The president and the entire administration have condemned violence in all forms as we have stated many times.” Sanders did not respond to questions about whether Trump planned to tone down his rhetoric.
Trump’s silence is notable for a president who never hesitates to spout off about issues large and small, from Venezuelan politics to "Saturday Night Live." It reflects a deep sensitivity by the president and his aides to accusations that his verbal assault on the free press, personalized attacks on political targets and racially charged language could incite violence. But it also illustrates a tactic that those who know Trump say he has used for decades to shape coverage while tearing down his opponents — comment on the issues he wants to amplify and get covered, while ignoring those that don’t fit his preferred narrative.
“Long before he arrived at the White House, President Trump learned to use media coverage to build a brand and shape positive narratives,” said a former White House official, who was granted anonymity to characterize the president’s approach to the media.
News of the alleged domestic terror plot comes the same week that the president has ramped up his criticism of the media, insisting that The New York Times is “a true ENEMY OF THE PEOPLE,” despite warnings from the newspaper’s publisher that such rhetoric puts journalists in danger. He also went after The Washington Post’s fact checker, a section that tracks Trump’s misstatements.
People close to the president argue that Trump shouldn’t be held responsible for the actions of a small group of disturbed individuals who happen to support him. And Trump’s allies don’t believe he has any intention of curbing his criticism of the press. They also note that some members of the Trump administration have been targeted by the president’s critics, including Sanders, who was asked to leave a restaurant, and senior White House adviser Kellyanne Conway, who recently disclosed that she was assaulted at a restaurant last year.
The president regularly fumes in public and in private about negative coverage of him, and he also believes there’s a political utility to undercutting the reporters who cover him, according to people who know him. It’s a strategy he’s been turning to most of his adult life, dating to his time in New York, where he would regularly engage with — and spar with — tabloid reporters.
“So, to a large extent he does it naturally, but his use of the media is also a product of a deliberate strategy to advance his own ideas and undercut contrary narratives,” the former White House official said.
Trump has often avoided engaging in a fulsome debate about the impact of his rhetoric, including after Cesar Sayoc’s October 2018 arrest for mailing a series of bombs to some of Trump’s political opponents.
After the incident, Trump called for unity during a rally in Wisconsin, saying, “No nation can succeed that tolerates violence or the threat of violence as a method of political intimidation, coercion, or control. We all know that. Such conduct must be fiercely opposed and firmly prosecuted.”
But the next day, he blamed the media. “A very big part of the Anger we see today in our society is caused by the purposely false and inaccurate reporting of the Mainstream Media that I refer to as Fake News,” he tweeted. “It has gotten so bad and hateful that it is beyond description. Mainstream Media must clean up its act, FAST!”
Watchdog groups continue to have deep concerns about the president’s attacks on the press. They warn his rhetoric is being repeated by dictators around the world.
“It’s irresponsible and dangerous,” said Alexandra Ellerbeck, the North America program coordinator at the Committee to Protect Journalists. “When we talk to journalists, they feel less safe than they used to.”
A January CPJ analysis found that Trump sent more than 1,300 tweets critical of the media since becoming a presidential candidate. Though Trump tweets less overall as president than he did as a candidate, CPJ found that Trump tweets critical of the press have nonetheless increased during the first two years of his presidency.
At the same time, the number of journalists imprisoned around the world on false news charges has risen to 28, compared with nine two years ago, according to a December 2018 report from CPJ.
Even U.S. journalists have faced violence and intimidation in recent months. In June 2018, a gunman killed five employees at the Capital Gazette in Maryland when he opened fire in the newsroom. CNN evacuated its New York office due to a bomb threat in December 2018. And earlier this month, a Trump supporter shoved a BBC cameraman at a rally.
Trump has occasionally made light of some of these violent incidents, joking last fall about a Republican congressman convicted of assault for body-slamming a reporter.
Still, most analysts are careful about directly blaming Trump for violence against journalists.
“I think it’s very difficult to draw a bright line between what comes out of the president’s mouth or his Twitter account and action from other individuals,” said Kathleen Bartzen Culver, director of the Center for Journalism Ethics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. “But that doesn’t mean we should accept a normalization of this rhetoric.”
Trump’s allies have pounced on journalists and others who were quick to connect Trump to the Smollett and Covington Catholic incidents, arguing that the president’s critics are so eager to cast the president and his supporters in a negative light that they don’t wait for all the facts to emerge.
But others haven’t exhibited the same caution when it comes to finger-pointing. MSNBC host Joe Scarborough, who has publicly sparred with the president, didn’t hold back on Thursday morning.
“This is pretty simple,” Scarborough said. “It’s all on the president’s shoulders, it’s all the president’s fault, and he sits there with his mouth shut for once in his life, doesn’t say anything, doesn’t tweet anything — which of course makes it even more on him.”
Scarborough was among the members of the media on the hit list of U.S. Coast Guard Lt. Christopher Paul Hasson, who was arrested earlier this month, according to authorities. Others included MSNBC hosts Chris Hayes and Ari Melber, and CNN's Don Lemon, Chris Cuomo and Van Jones.
Scarborough and others have noted that news of the alleged plot to kill Democratic politicians and journalists broke just hours after New York Times publisher A.G. Sulzberger chastised Trump for calling the Times the “enemy of the American people” after it published an account of the president’s efforts to undercut the investigations encircling him.
“The phrase ‘enemy of the people’ is not just false, it’s dangerous. It has an ugly history of being wielded by dictators and tyrants who sought to control public information. And it is particularly reckless coming from someone whose office gives him broad powers to fight or imprison the nation’s enemies,” Sulzberger wrote. “As I have repeatedly told President Trump face to face, there are mounting signs that this incendiary rhetoric is encouraging threats and violence against journalists at home and abroad.”
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine
Wisconsin Gov. Tony Evers pushed back Thursday against Miami-based critics of Milwaukee’s bid for the Democratic National Convention next year, telling his home-state newspaper that they’re missing the mark by talking up their fancy hotels and restaurants like elitists.
"I think that Democrats have an extraordinarily large tent — people from all walks of life — and Milwaukee is absolutely the best place for them," a chuckling Evers told the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. "If Miami is touting themselves as the place for wealthy Democrats to show up, there won't be many."
Evers’ comments came after Florida Democratic insiders derided Milwaukee in a story about Miami’s pitch to host the 2020 convention.
While the Wisconsin governor says he’s laughing at Miami swagger, Florida officials characterized his response as a “hissy fit.”
Miami Beach Mayor Dan Gelber, who is leading the South Florida region’s efforts for the convention, sounded surprised with the governor’s reaction. Despite Evers saying Miami’s pitch was both errant and “kind of funny,” Gelber said he wouldn’t return fire.
“I don’t get into hissy fits,” Gelber said. “I’m sure Milwaukee is a very nice city.”
Still, behind the scenes, Miami has made sure to emphasize what they say is the superior quality and number of its hotels for the 16,000 convention-goers. Just six months before the 2020 convention, Miamians note, Super Bowl LIV is coming to town.
Milwaukee’s supply is more limited — Miami organizers contend the city doesn’t have a hotel large enough to house the entire California delegation.
Article originally published on POLITICO Magazine